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Martin Hägglund’s Radical Atheism is a tour de force. It announces as much in its
opening sentence: ‘this book presents a sustained attempt to reassess the entire
trajectory of Derrida’s work’ (1). It lives up to this bold claim, offering a remarkable
tour of Jacques Derrida’s diverse and demanding oeuvre via lucid arguments and
clear prose. Hägglund demonstrates an impressive command of Derrida’s corpus,
marshaling these materials skillfully and effectively in rigorous, firmly grounded
textual analyses, and he does so without reducing his text to simply a string of
quotations, for which his words provide merely connective tissue. These
accomplishments are themselves noteworthy, and they enable his text to achieve a
fresh reading of Derrida’s work in terms of both form and content.
Much of Radical Atheism’s success on both fronts are due to a very wellorganized tour of Derrida’s writings. Hägglund arranges his textual tour by way of
encounters, as four of his five chapters stage exchanges with thinkers and disciplines
with which Derrida has extended and defining engagements. Articulated in these
structural terms, the encounters are with: Immanuel Kant and transcendental
philosophy, Edmund Husserl and phenomenology, Emmanuel Levinas and ethics,
and Ernesto Laclau and politics. In these chapters, Hägglund presents careful, critical
studies of Derrida’s respective writings; he presents exegetical explications—and I
use this word advisedly, for Radical Atheism explicates rather than assumes
familiarity with unexamined rhetorical pirouettes (a.k.a. jargon). Rather than offering
a laundry list of Derridean keywords (including supplement, différance, trace,
hymen, pharmakon, etc.), Hägglund focuses on four such terms: autoimmunity,
arkhē, survival, and above all for Hägglund, espacement: ‘if there were one key
word in Derrida’s work, it would be espacement, which is shorthand for the
coimplication of temporalization and spatialization’ (72). Espacement describes the
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becoming-space of time and the becoming-time of space that together mobilize
arche-writing.
As this emphasis on espacement reveals, the tour that Radical Atheism takes
remains resolutely phenomenological, with particular emphasis on temporality. Even
ethics is refigured along these lines: ‘in Derrida “the other” does not primarily
designate another human being. On the contrary, alterity is indissociable from the
spacing of time. Such spacing is irreducibly violent because it breaches any
interiority and exposes everyone—myself as well as any other—to the perils of
finitude’ (75). This passage is telling, since by phenomenologically binding alterity
to temporal espacement, itself grounded in irreducible finitude, alterity is prevented
from floating into airy abstraction. Instead, ‘finitude entails that the other is infinitely
other’ (94), for ‘the other is infinitely other—its alterity cannot be overcome or
recuperated by anyone else—because the other is finite’ (110). Radical Atheism
makes similar moves with respect to transcendental philosophy, politics, and
religion, in each case insisting on the inescapability of finitude and of its perils,
which (as he repeatedly and rightly reiterates) involve threat as much as chance.
Finitude also provides crucial insight into radical atheism vis-à-vis survival,
which defines life (phenomenologically) as fundamentally finite and essentially
divided by time. Insofar as survival is synonymous with mortality, human life is
survival: ‘living is always a matter of living on, of surviving’ (33), in and as an
unconditional affirmation of life. Survival is a key to radical atheism, which
‘proceeds from the argument that everything that can be desired is mortal in its
essence,’ and ‘since God does not exhibit the mortality that makes something
desirable,’ God is undesirable (111). This syllogism apparently depends on a rather
impoverished conception of God, who, as immortal, seems to be Aristotelian (as
thought thinking itself) or nominalist (as absolutely transcendent) or a similar
theological variation. In its explicit analyses of religion, Radical Atheism belies
the careful, critical, subtle expositions of other chapters and, in so doing, reveals
that it is also a tour de force. When it comes to religion, radical atheism (which
might, perhaps, be nicknamed radical unorthodoxy) tends to strong-arm, with
Hägglund asserting that ‘following the logical of radical atheism, I will demonstrate
how all attempts to assimilate Derrida’s thinking to a religious framework are
wrongheaded’ (116). But such demonstrations tend to subsume treatments of faith
(one of Derrida’s ‘two sources of religion’) in arguments against the unscathed (the
other of Derrida’s ‘sources’), possibly because Radical Atheism’s reading of
religion turns on autoimmunity, a term that Derrida aligns with the unscathed rather
than faith.
More pointedly, Radical Atheism directs much of its force against its ‘religious’
opponents, namely, Hent de Vries, Richard Kearney, and especially John Caputo, who
‘systematically misreads Derrida’ (116). Caputo ‘reads the paradox of impossibility in
the wrong direction’ (122), and his ‘reading of the messianic is quite untenable’ (135).
Bracketing whether Hägglund’s reading of Caputo is itself tenable, this points to a
broader, methodological concern: a strangely selective use of sources. To give only
two examples, Radical Atheism does not mention Caputo’s most recent book (in
which Caputo addresses many of Hägglund’s concerns avant la lettre)—nor, more
disconcertingly, does it cite Derrida’s essay on survival (‘Survivre,’ translated as
‘Living On: Border Lines’) despite its near-dependency on this conceptual figure.
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Moreover, Radical Atheism never engages in a reflexive examination that would
question whether radical atheism is not itself deconstructible.
Regardless, Radical Atheism’s tour de force is remarkable and certainly worthy of
the attention it continues to receive, both for its own merits and because any
discussion of Derrida and religion will now have to attend to and contend with
Hägglund’s powerful text.

